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Abstract. The relationship between social segregation and workplace 
segregation has been traditionally studied as a one-way causal relationship 
mediated by referral hiring. In this paper we introduce an alternative framework 
which describes the dynamic relationships between social segregation, 
workplace segregation, individuals’ homophily levels, and referral hiring. An 
agent-based simulation model was developed based on this framework. The 
model describes the process of continuous change in composition of workplaces 
and social networks of agents, and how this process affects levels of workplace 
segregation and the segregation of social networks of the agents (people). It is 
concluded that: (1) social segregation and workplace segregation may co-
evolve even when hiring of workers occurs mainly through formal channels and 
the population is initially integrated (2) majority groups tend to be more 
homophilous than minority groups, and (3) referral hiring may be beneficial for 
minority groups when the population is highly segregated.  
Keywords: social networks, segregation, referral hiring, agent-based 
simulation. 
1 Introduction 
According to the Contact Hypothesis (Amir 1969; Allport 1954), contact between 
different social (ethnic, racial and/or religious) groups promotes trust, tolerance and 
social integration. When individuals’ social networks become more segregated (that 
is, social relationships are formed with others of similar gender, race, ethnicity, and/or 
religion) the chance of their contacts crossing their group’s boundary is reduced, 
leading to increasing levels of stereotyping and intolerance.  
Similarly, workplace segregation may also reduce the chance of intergroup contact. 
In addition to these negative social effects, workplace segregation may have negative 
economic consequences. For example, it may introduce high levels of income and 
employment inequality among social groups (Carrington & Troske 1998; Glass 1990; 
Granovetter 1995; Tassier & Menczer 2008). Moreover, workplace segregation may 
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also affect the economic system as a whole through its effects on the efficiency of 
allocating workers to jobs (Becker 1971). 
Although both act as barriers against intergroup contact, workplace segregation 
and social segregation (segregation of individuals’ social networks) have been studied 
as two separate areas of research. Moreover, research (especially on workplace 
segregation) has focused mainly on the consequences (for example income and 
employment inequality) rather than the determinants and dynamics of segregation. 
In research on social segregation, the homophilous attitudes of individuals have 
been considered the main determinant of segregation (Amir 1969; Allport 1954). The 
homophily principle implies that people are attracted by nature to others similar to 
themselves, and are more likely to create social ties with them as described by the 
proverb “birds of a feather flock together” (McPherson et al. 2001). This similarity 
among individuals may be evaluated on the basis of gender, race, religion and 
ethnicity or other factors.  
On the other hand, in research on workplace segregation, referral hiring (hiring 
through social or familial contacts) has been considered the main source of 
segregation. Using social and familial contacts to search for jobs is a widespread 
practice. Granovetter (1973, 1995) found that more than half of workers in the U.S. 
knew about their jobs through informal channels (friends, relatives, and other social 
contacts). In a recent study conducted by the authors about workplaces and social 
networks in Egypt, 65 percent of workers used these informal methods of seeking 
employment. Elliott (2001) explains how referral hiring could promote workplace 
segregation: 
“[Referral hiring] creates a built-in bias toward incumbents: 
members of a particular ethnic group concentrate in 
particular jobs and when new employment opportunities 
become available at their workplace, they pass this 
information along to [their] social contacts, often of the same 
race and ethnic background”(p. 401).  
According to Elliot’s analysis, the relationship between social segregation and 
workplace segregation has been assumed to be a one-way causal relationship. In this 
relationship, the independent variable is the level of social segregation and the 
dependent variable is the level of workplace segregation, with level of referral hiring 
as a moderating variable (see for example Elliott 2001; Tassier 2005; Tassier & 
Menczer 2008). When using referral hiring for employment, the effect of segregated 
individual social networks would be expected to increase workplace segregation.  
In the current work, we argue that the relationship between social and workplaces 
segregation can also go in the other direction; that is, workplace segregation can 
affect (as well as be affected by) social segregation.  Empirical literature confirms that 
high percentage of our social relations are embedded in organizations (Grossetti 
2005). Organizations contribute to the construction of the pool of candidates whom 
people might create social relations with. Thus, when these pools become segregated 
social segregation is promoted and vice versa.  
In this paper, we introduce a general framework to study the dynamic and 
reciprocal relationships between social segregation and workplace segregation, 
homophily levels, and referral hiring. An agent-based simulation model for the labour 
market has been developed based on this framework. The model creates an artificial 
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society where agents (people) use their social networks to search for jobs. As 
simulated time passes, agents change their social networks by creating new social 
links (ties) with each other while other links dissolve. Also, the composition of 
workplaces (the proportion of workers from different societal groups) may change 
through the turnover of workers. The model describes this process of continuous 
change in the composition of workplaces and social networks of agents, and how it 
affects levels of workplace segregation and the segregation of the social networks of 
agents.  
We argue here that agent-based modelling (ABM) is an appropriate methodology 
that fits well the purpose of the current work. Our main objective is to understand the 
co-emergence and dynamics of two complex phenomena; that is, social and 
workplace segregation. Both involve non-linear interactions among heterogeneous 
agents on different levels (for example, workers and firms), which makes 
computational models more flexible than mathematical and statistical models (Gilbert 
& Troitzsch 2005). Besides, agents provide a good analogy to individuals; therefore, 
ABM is more appropriate than other computational techniques when dealing with 
interactions involving people. For these reasons ABM has been successfully used in 
segregation research since the famous Schelling (1971) model of residential 
segregation. 
This paper is organized as follows. A brief review of related research is presented 
in Section 2. In section 3, we introduce the proposed framework for the relationship 
between social segregation and workplace segregation. Then, in Section 4, the agent-
based simulation model is presented. The results of the simulation model are 
discussed in Section 5. In Section 6, we discuss how the model was validated against 
different sources of empirical data. Finally, the conclusion and summary of the main 
findings are presented in Section 7. 
2 Review of Related Research 
Granovetter’s seminal work (1973, 1995) documented the widespread use of 
referral hiring and emphasized the importance of social ties, especially weak ties, as a 
source of job information and attainment. Most research after Granovetter focused on 
the role of social networks for the transmission of job information and opportunities, 
and how this affects job attainment and employment inequality (for a review of this 
research see Ioannides & Loury 2004). 
Using agent-based simulation Calvó-Armengol and Jackson (2007, 2004) showed 
that employment is positively correlated across time and agents. That is, the 
employment statuses of path-connected agents are positively correlated. When some 
agents are employed, then it is more likely that other agents in contact with them will 
receive job information from them. This holds even in different points in time. Similar 
results were obtained by Krauth (2004) who showed that the likelihood of 
employment is positively correlated with the size of an individual’s social network 
and the employment rates of those in contact with them. 
Calvó-Armengol and Jackson also found that unemployment exhibits duration 
dependence; that is, the probability of obtaining a job decreases with the length of 
time that an agent has been unemployed. They examined inequality between two 
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arbitrary groups and showed that when one group starts with a worse employment 
status, then that group’s drop-out rate will be higher and their employment prospects 
will be persistently below that of the other group. 
Little research has focused on the determinants of workplace segregation, and even 
Calvó-Armengol and Jackson defined social networks exogenously with no mention 
of the effect of workplace segregation on social segregation. For example, Tassier and 
Menczer (2008) introduced an agent-based simulation model to study the effect of 
referral hiring on group level inequality for a given social network structure and social 
segregation. Building on Watts and Strogatz’s small world model (Watts 1999; Watts 
& Strogatz 1998), Tassier and Menczer introduced a method for controlling network 
structure and level of social segregation. The results of the simulation showed that 
more random social networks produces higher employment rates than less random 
social networks if the population is integrated or information flows about job 
vacancies are random. However, if the population is highly segregated and 
information flows about job vacancies are non-random then less random social 
networks have higher employment rates than more random social networks.  
Using a different methodology, and based on an implicit assumption of complete 
social segregation, Tassier (2005) developed a Markov model to study the effects of 
referral hiring on workplace segregation and inequality between two social groups. In 
this model, the proportion of the minority group in the firm determines its state, and 
the transition probabilities are determined by the proportion of unemployed 
individuals from each group and the current state of the firm. The model showed that 
the level of workplace segregation increases with the increase of referral hiring, and a 
complete segregation occurs when all workers find their jobs by referral hiring. 
Moreover, Tassier argued that referral firing does not produce group-level 
employment inequality. Tassier (2008) used this Markov model to study how referral 
hiring produced gender segregation among employees at US colleges and universities. 
Models of strategic network formation focus on how expectations about labour 
market outcomes influence individuals’ decisions regarding their social networks (for 
a review of these models see Jackson 2004). For example, Gemkow and Neugart 
(2008) have recently developed an agent-based model of the labour market where 
agents (workers) invest some of their resources into building and maintaining their 
social networks as an insurance device against future job losses. They found that 
larger variability in firms' labour demand reduces the workers' investment into their 
social networks which leads to lower inequality. However, none of this strategic 
network formation research focused on segregation. 
3 A General Framework for the Relationship between Social and 
Workplace Segregation 
Figure 1 summarises the proposed framework to study social and workplace 
segregation. In this framework, reciprocal causal relationships are assumed to exist 
between social segregation, workplace segregation, and individuals’ homophily levels 
(each arrow in Figure 1 indicates positive causal relationships between the variables 
at its two ends). 
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For example, social segregation may affect workplace segregation. When firms 
tend to hire new workers through referrals, especially referrals from other existing 
workers (insider referrals), and when social networks of people tend to be segregated, 
this promotes workplaces segregation. As explained earlier, most previous research 
has focused on this effect of social segregation on workplace segregation (see for 
example Elliott 2001; Mouw 2002; Tassier 2005; and Tassier & Menczer 2008). On 
the other hand, when workplaces become more segregated, the chance for people 
from different social groups to work together and create social relations at work is 
reduced, and this increases social segregation (given the empirical evidence that a 
high percentage of social relations are created at workplaces (Grossetti 2005)). 
Empirical data gathered by the authors (see Section 5) about labour market and 
social networks in Egypt in 2007 support this hypothesised reciprocal relation 
between social and workplace segregation. The number of Coptic friends of Muslim 
workers was strongly correlated with the proportion of Coptic worker in his firm. 
The relationship between homophily levels and social segregation is not difficult to 
explain, and it is a direct application of the contact hypothesis (Amir 1969; Allport 
1954). By definition, an individual’s homophily level is a bias towards creating social 
ties with similar others. So, higher levels of homophily coincide with higher levels of 
social segregation. On the other hand, when social networks become more integrated, 
individuals have a higher chance to have contact with others from different social 
groups, and this hinders their homophilous attitudes.  
Many empirical studies (for example:  Ellison & Powers 1994; Emerson et al. 
2002; Robinson 1980; Sigelman & Welch 1993; Williams 1964; Yancey 1999) have 
documented decreasing levels of prejudice and stereotyping with more intergroup 
contact given a set of favourable conditions (for example, equal status of contact 
groups, institutional support, and pursuit of common goals). For example Emerson et 
al (2002) found that those who had experienced prior interracial contact in schools 
and neighbourhoods were more likely, as adults, to have more racially diverse general 
social groups and friendship circles. 
Firnally, the relationship between homophily levels and workplace segregation can 
be described as follows. Individuals’ homophily levels may affect workplace 
Exit patterns 
And 
Hiring Discrimination 
 
Social Segregation 
 
Workplace Segregation 
 
Homophily Levels 
 
Referral Hiring 
Chance for inter-group social ties 
Homophilous Social 
Networks 
Inter-group 
contact 
Figure 1. The proposed framework to study the relationship between social and workplace 
segregation.  
Inter-group 
contact 
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segregation through their effects on the exit patterns of workers and hiring 
discrimination. As empirical studies show (for example Sørensen (2004)), workers 
with high levels of homophily tend to stay longer in segregated workplaces where 
their groups are over-represented than in other workplaces. Also, higher homophily 
levels among employers promotes hiring discrimination (that is, employers’ 
preferences to hire workers of the same social group as their own (Becker 1971)), and 
this increases workplace segregation. In turn, workplace segregation may affect the 
homophily levels of individuals. Segregated workplaces reduce the chance for 
intergroup contact, which promotes homophilous attitudes and vice versa. 
4 An Agent-Based Simulation Model 
Based on the framework presented in the previous section, we present an agent-
based model which describes the dynamic relationship between the main variables: 
social segregation, workplace segregation, homophily levels, and referral hiring. First, 
we describe the model’s specification and then some of the simulation results. 
4.1 Agents  
The model creates an artificial society of N equally-qualified agents (representing 
persons). Each agent belongs to one of two different social groups; for simplicity, we 
call them Red and Green. Assume that the Red group is the minority, and its 
proportion in the society is P (where 0<P<0.5).  
4.2 Social Networks 
A Social Network is a “set of people who are most likely to be sources of a variety 
of rewarding interactions, such as discussing a personal problem, borrowing money, 
or social recreation” (McCallister & Fischer 1983:78). Each agent has its own ego-
centric social network. For each agent, the maximum possible size of its social 
network (maximum number of alters at one time) is Si, i=1, 2,…, N.  
Homophily Levels. Agents create social links with each other based on their 
homophily levels, hi [0,1]. An agent’s homophily level indicates its bias to create 
social links with other agents of the same colour (group) as its own. For example, a 
Red agent would create a social link to another Red agent with the following 
probability1 (and it creates a link to a Green agent with the complement probability): 
                                                           
1 Analogously,  
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(1) 
In formula (1), (small) p refers to the proportion of Red agents available within the 
context of link creation. For example, when a Red agent joins a workplace, and it is 
about to create a social link to one of the existing co-workers, p would refer to the 
proportion of other Red workers (who are not linked to the agent) in that workplace. 
Based on formula (1), with h=0, all links are created at random, and all agents will 
have the same probability p to create links with Red agents and the probability 1- p to 
create links with Green agents. With h=1, each agent would create links only with 
other similar agents (if such agents are available, otherwise with other agents of the 
other colour).  
Agents are initialized with a zero homophily level. However, an agent’s homophily 
level changes over time, and is assumed to depend – in addition to its current level - 
on five factors: (1) composition of its social network, (2) average homophily level of 
alters in its social network, (3) composition of its workplace, (4) average homophily 
level of its workmates, and (5) overall average homophily of all agents in society. 
Thus, for a Red agent, its homophily level at time t+1, ht+1, can be written as a 
weighted average of its homophily level ht and the effects of these five factors as: 
  
ht+1 = [ht + α1(pn – P)/(1-P) + α2 (mean homophily of alters) + α3(pw – P)/(1-P) 
+  α4 (mean homophily of workmates) + α5 (overall mean homophily of 
all agents)] / (1+ α1+ α2+ α3+ α4 +α5) 
(2) 
 
where ht is the agent’s homophily level at time t, pn is the proportion of alters of 
Red colour in agent’s social network, pw the proportion of Red workmates, and  α1, 
α2, α3, α4 and α5 are constants reflecting the relative importance of the associated 
components. 
Directed vs. Undirected Links. In forming their social networks agents create 
directed (asymmetric), rather than undirected (symmetric) social links with each other 
to represent the potential asymmetry in the evaluation of social links, and the 
asymmetry in job knowledge and access (Tassier 2005).  
Origins of Social Relations. In line with Fischer (1982), agents create social links 
through three sources: workplaces, other friends/relatives (other links) and random 
acquaintances. At each time step of a simulation run, each “working” agent has a 
probability LW to create a social link to one of its co-workers. Also, at each time step, 
each agent has a probability LN to create a new link with another agent through its 
existing social network (in other words, with another agent who is already linked with 
one of the agent’s social network), and a probability LR to create a new link with 
another agent at random. The actual values of the probabilities LW, LN, and LR that will 
be used in the simulation (as will appear in Table 1) are based on our collected data 
about social networks and workplaces in Egypt (and are supported by Grossetti 
(2005)) which showed that around three fifths of social relations develop within 
workplaces, while random acquaintances are very small proportion. Finally, to keep 
the initial distribution of links constant among agents, all extra links (more than Si) 
will be removed at random.  
 8 
4.3 Workplaces and Jobs 
Our artificial labour market includes a number of firms, F, each of which having a 
number of jobs (θf). We assume that all jobs are identical (so, any agent can do any 
job with the same efficiency). Each firm has a “colour” which indicates the group 
identity of its owner/manager (employer). Suppose that the proportion of Red firms is 
P. Hiring discrimination for a firm f, Df, is defined as the mean homophily level of its 
workers multiplied by a regulating scalar discrimination-const. Besides, each firm, f, 
has a total of tf agents (workers), which can be divided into rf Red agents and gf Green 
agents, such that tf = rf + gf, . Let pf = rf / tf be the proportion of the minority (Red) 
group inside this firm. Finally, let denote total number of currently working 
agents.  
Hiring Process. At each time step each firm hires a number of agents (workers) to 
fill its vacant jobs. Firms can hire new agents either through referrals from current 
workers (with probability R) or through formal channels (with probability 1-R). If a 
firm decides to hire a worker through formal methods it simply picks one of the 
unemployed workers at random.  In case of hiring through referrals from current 
workers, firms may practice hiring discrimination against the candidate workers. Let 
Q represent the group of candidate workers, i.e., unemployed workers who have 
social links with at least one of the current workers in the firm. If no such workers 
exist, firms hire through formal channels. For example, a Red firm would hire a Red 
agent through referral with the probability: 
Prob(Red firm to hire Red  worker through referral)= 
 
 
 
(3) 
and it hires a Green agent with the complement probability, where pQ refers to the 
proportion of Red agents in the group Q. 
Workers’ Turnover.  At each time step of the simulation run, each working agent 
has some probability to leave its workplace. This probability depends on the agent’s 
homophily level, h, and its workplace composition (how different the proportion of its 
group inside the workplace, p, is from the overall group proportion in the society, P). 
For example, the probability of a Red agent to leave its workplace at any time step is 
given by: 
ER= β(1 + h (P – p) ) (4) 
where β is a constant regulating the speed of workers’ turnover (for Green agents, P 
and p should be replaced by (1-P) and (1-p) respectively in (4)). For an agent with 
zero-homophily, its probability to leave equals β regardless of the proportion, p, of its 
group in the workplace. On the other hand, an agent with a non-zero homophily, h, 
would have an increasing probability to leave as its group’s proportion p inside the 
workplace decreases away from its overall proportion P, and vice versa. 
 9 
4.4 Statistics and Indexes 
We are particularly interested in measuring levels of social segregation and 
workplace segregation in addition to employment levels for minority and majority 
groups.  
Index of Social Segregation. The segregation index, S, developed by Freeman 
(1978:416)2 is used to measure level of social segregation. S measures the deviation of 
the distribution of links between two agents from different groups from the 
distribution expected when links are created at random: 
 (5) 
where E(e*) is the expected number of links between two agents from different 
groups under the assumption that links are created at random, and e* is the actual 
number of such links.  
E(e*) is given by (adapted from Freeman (1978:416)): 
 (6) 
where L is the total number of links in the global social network, and N (number of 
agents) and P (proportion of Red agents) are as defined before.  
Indexes of Workplace Segregation. A modified version of the Gini index, , 
developed by Carrington and Troske (1997:406) will be used to measure workplace 
segregation.  measures the deviation of the distribution of workers from different 
social groups inside firms from random distribution (which is the case in which 
workers are randomly allocated to firms) and is given by: 
 
 (7) 
where  (8) 
where G is the standard Gini index (James & Taeuber 1985:5) and G* is the Gini 
index calculated if the workers (with minority proportion P) were randomly 
distributed to the firms (with given sizes)3.  
                                                           
2 Although Freeman developed this index to measure segregation in social networks with 
undirected links, it can be easily shown that it is also valid for directed links. 
3 G* can be calculated by simulating a random allocation of workers, with given N and P, to a 
number of firms F, with specified size distribution. The value of G* used in subsequent 
If and only if E(e*)≥e*         
Otherwise 
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The modified Gini index is more suitable than the standard Gini index or other 
indexes which measure the deviation of the distribution of workers from proportional 
distribution (the case in which all social groups are proportionally represented in all 
firms), for two reasons. Firstly, we are interested in simulating a labour market with 
small-to-medium sized firms (which increases the possibility of getting a high Gini 
index with a complete random allocation of workers). Secondly, we are particularly 
interested in measuring the systematic rather than random changes in workplace and 
social segregation.  
4.5 Model Dynamics 
The simulation starts with creating an artificial society of a number of agents from 
two different groups with a random social network for each agent. A number of firms 
F are created, each with a specified number of jobs θf , and then agents are assigned 
randomly to firms. The final step of the initialization process is to calculate and plot 
statistics for this initial stage, which include mainly indexes of segregation for 
workplaces and social networks in addition to employment levels. Then at each time 
step: 
1. Each working agent leaves its workplace with the proper probability (as given by 
formula (4)) 
2. Each firm hires a number of agents, either randomly (through formal channels) or 
through referrals from current workers, depending on the probability R. 
3. Agents update their homophily levels (according to formula (2)) and their social 
networks. Each agent creates a link through the workplace (if the agent is 
employed), through other links and/or randomly with the proper probabilities (LW, 
LN  and/or LR respectively). 
4. Statistics are calculated and plotted. 
5 Simulation Results 
In the following we summarize the results of the simulation model4 for workplace 
segregation, social segregation and the unemployment levels of minority and majority 
groups. The results are based on the values of parameters presented in Table 1. Unless 
otherwise specified, each simulation experiment is based on 30 runs; each lasts for 
500 time steps. 
 
                                                                                                                                           
sections is the average of values obtained through simulating the random allocation of 
workers to firms in 200 simulation runs. 
4 The model was written in Netlogo 4.0 developed by Wilensky, U., 1999, Center for 
Connected Learning and Computer-Based Modeling, Northwestern University, 
http://ccl.northwestern.edu/netlogo. 
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5.1 Referral Hiring, Workplace Segregation and Social Segregation 
The results summarized in Figure 2 show the co-evolution of workplace 
segregation and social segregation with different levels of referral hiring. Both 
workplace segregation and social segregation increase with increasing level of referral 
hiring. An interesting result is that significant levels of workplace segregation and 
social segregation may evolve even when hiring of workers occurs mainly through 
formal channels and the society is initially integrated. Figure 3 shows the levels of 
social and workplace segregation during one of the simulation runs with three levels 
of referral hiring 0.0, 0.6, and 1.0 (only three levels are considered to avoid the figure 
getting very crowded). The random allocation of workers to firms may introduce 
some level of workplace segregation which triggers an increasing (but still low) levels 
of homophily and social segregation which, in turn, promotes workplace segregation 
(through the exit patterns of workers), and so on. Higher levels of referral hiring make 
workplace composition more dependent on agents’ social networks and promote this 
reciprocal reinforcement between social and workplace segregation; thus, pushing 
both to higher levels. 
 
Table 1.  Parameters values and description for the simulation model. 
Parameter  Description Value 
General   
α1, α2, α3, α4 and α5 Constants regulating the change in homophily levels. 0.4 
β A constant regulating workers turnover. 0.1 
Agents   
N Total number of agents 1000 
P Proportion of the minority (Red) group 0.2 
Social Networks   
Si Size of social networks of agents 10 
LW  Probability of creating a new link with other co-workers  0.3 
LN Probability of creating a new link through current links 0.5 
LR Probability of creating a new link randomly 0.01 
Workplaces   
F Number of firms 40 
θf Number of jobs in each firm 20 
discrimination-const A regulating scalar for hiring discrimination 1 
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 Figure 2. Co-evolution of workplace segregation (G and ) and social segregation (S) for 
different levels of referral hiring (R). 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5. Unemployment levels of minority group across time with R=0, 0.8 and 1. 
 
 
Social Segregation (S) Workplace Segregation (G) 
Figure 3. Co-evolution of workplace segregation and social segregation across time with 
different levels of referral hiring. 
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5.2 Homophily Levels 
The results of the simulation show that even when we start with a zero-level of 
homophily, agents of majority groups, generally, end with higher homophily levels 
than those of minority groups (as shown in Figure 4). The main reason is that 
minority people have a higher chance to have outgroup links (through social networks 
or workplaces) than majority group members. However, this difference in homophily 
levels vanishes gradually as the minority proportion increases. 
 
5.3 Employment Inequality 
An interesting result of the simulation model is that increasing levels of referral 
hiring could be beneficial for minority groups when the population is highly 
segregated and harmful otherwise. As Figure 5 shows, minority unemployment 
generally decreases with increasing level of referral hiring until it reaches a minimum 
(with R=0.8 in our experiment) and then increases. When referral hiring is low 
(hence, lower levels of workplace and social segregation), all unemployed agents will 
have the same chance to join any workplace with vacant jobs, and will have the same 
 Figure 4. Final mean homophily levels for minority and majority groups for different 
levels of referral hiring (R). 
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probability to exit their workplaces, hence all social groups will have similar 
unemployment levels (around 20 percent in our experiments). This is clearly 
illustrated in Figure 6 with the case of R=0. But with higher levels of referral hiring 
(the cases R=0.8 and R=1), minority unemployment tends to be higher than majority 
unemployment at the early stage of the simulation while there are still low levels of 
workplace and social segregation. However, as time passes and segregation increases, 
referral hiring benefits the minority’s employment. For example, when R=0.8, 
minority unemployment attains a stationary level of 16 percent. When level of referral 
hiring is close to one, a complete segregation of workplaces (and social networks) is 
reached, the firms are distributed proportionally between minority and majority 
groups, and all groups have the same unemployment level (20 percent). 
This relationship between referral hiring and minority employment is consistent 
with Tassier and Menczer’s (2008) model  where they show that: 
“more random social networks [majority groups] yield higher employment 
rates than less random social networks [minority groups] if the population 
is integrated [in early stage of our simulation] or information flows about 
job vacancies are random  [low level of referral hiring]. However if the 
population is highly segregated and information flows about job vacancies 
are non-random [with high level of referral hiring in later stages of 
simulation run] then less random social networks have higher  employment 
rates than more random social networks. This second finding holds because 
non-random social networks allow a group to better contain job 
information inside the group when a population is segregated.” (p. 1)  
 
 Figure 5. Unemployment levels of minority group for different levels of referral hiring, R. 
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Figure 6. Unemployment levels of minority group across time with R=0, 0.8 and 1. 
5.4 Minority Proportion and Segregation 
Increasing the proportion of the minority group might be expected to decrease 
social and workplace segregation. As Figure 7 shows, there is a negative relationship 
between the proportion of the minority and social and workplace segregation. With a 
larger minority, the probability for individuals to have social links to others from a 
different social group increases and this decreases social and workplace segregation. 
The proportion of minority also affects the level of segregation at the initial stages of 
the simulation. As described earlier, mere random allocation of workers to jobs, 
during the initial stages of simulation, creates some level of workplace segregation, 
and this level increases as the proportion of the minority decreases.  
 
 Figure 7. The effect of minority proportion on workplace segregation (G and G^) and 
social segregation (S) 
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5.5 Firms’ Sizes and Segregation 
Many empirical studies suggest that there is negative relationship between firm 
sizes (measured by number of workers) and workplace segregation (for example: 
Sørensen 2004, Holzer 1998). Most of these studies argue that large firms may be less 
segregated because they are subject to more regulation and oversight about hiring 
practices. The main concern of the current simulation experiment is to answer the 
following question: would this negative relationship between firm size and 
segregation still exist even when all firms follow the same hiring practices (in other 
words, when we control for hiring practices)? 
As presented in Figure 8, the simulation results show that there is a strong negative 
relationship between average firms’ sizes and social and workplace segregation even 
when all firms are assumed to follow the same hiring practices (all firms use referral 
hiring with the same probability, R). This negative relationship could be explained by 
two factors. Firstly, larger firms have lower levels of segregation at the initial stages 
of the simulation. Secondly, in larger firms, there is a greater chance that they will 
have workers from different social groups proportionally represented, which in turn 
increases the probability for social links to be established among these workers, and 
this decreases both social and workplace segregation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8. The effect of firm size on workplace segregation (G and G^) and social 
segregation (S). 
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6 Model Validation 
The model’s behaviour was checked against data describing the Egyptian labour 
market and social networks. Egypt can be divided into a majority Muslim population 
and a 6 percent minority of Coptic Christians. Three sources of data were used to 
estimate the model’s parameters:  
1. Social Contract Survey (SCS) (Information and Decision Support Centre, 
the Egyptian Cabinet, 2005, unpublished data).  SCS was carried out in 17 
of the 26 Egyptian governorates. It involved structured interviews with 6006 
household representing 29,417 individuals. As Table 2 shows, SCS was used 
to estimate the proportion of the Coptic minority, the overall unemployment 
rate, and unemployment rates for Muslims and Copts. 
2. Workers’ Status in Industrial Enterprises Survey (WSIES) (Social 
Research Centre, American University in Cairo, 2005, unpublished data).  
WSIES was used to assess the status of workers in industrial enterprises. The 
survey’s sample included 324 randomly-chosen industrial enterprises with 10 
or more employees in each; 2694 male workers and 646 female workers. The 
sample covered six governorates: Cairo, Alexandria, Sharkkia, Gharbia, 
Kalubia and Giza. WSIES data provided estimates for numbers of workers, 
firms, jobs, Coptic employers, and Muslim employers (Table 2), in addition to 
estimates of workplace segregation (Table 3).  
3. Empirical Data (ED) gathered by the first author. These data involved 
structured interviews with a subsample from the WSIES with 39 employers 
(owners or mangers of small-to-medium industrial firms), and 122 workers (81 
Muslim and 41 Coptic) in four Egyptian governorates: Cairo, Alexandria, 
Sharkkia, and Kalubia. Employer interviews provided data about firm’s 
religious composition, recruitment practices, and hiring discrimination. 
Worker questionnaires provided information about social networks’ sizes, 
structure, and composition, and how they were used for job search.  
Table 2 presents the values for the model’s parameters estimated from these three 
data sources. 
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The results presented in Table 3 show that there a close similarity between the 
observed and the simulated values. All confidence intervals (CIs) of the difference 
between of the observed and simulated values contain the zero point, indicating that 
they are not significantly different. 
 
Table 3. Comparing observed and simulated values of variables in the simulation model. 
Variable Name Observed Value 
Simulation 
Value 
Std. 
Error 
95% CI of 
Difference 
Social Segregation 0.802 0.796 0.004 (-0.013, 0.001) 
Workplace Segregation - Gini 0.932 0.925 0.003 (-0.0136, 0.0002) 
Muslims unemployment 0.133 0.1334 0.0002 (-0.0008, 0.0009) 
Copts unemployment 0.079 0.074 0.003 (-0.011, 0.002) 
    
7 Conclusion 
In this paper we introduced a general framework to describe the dynamic 
relationships between social segregation, workplace segregation, homophily levels, 
and referral hiring, and formalised the framework as an agent-based simulation 
model. The model was validated against data from the Egyptian labour market and 
social networks. The simulation indicated that the labour market may experience 
significant levels of workplace segregation and social segregation even when hiring of 
workers occurs mainly through formal channels. The results also show that minority 
groups tend to be more homophilous than majority groups, that referral hiring may be 
beneficial for minority groups especially when the population is highly segregated, 
and that the relationship between referral hiring and minority unemployment is not 
Table 2. Estimated values for model’s parameters based on data about social networks and workplaces 
in Egypt. 
Parameter Name Parameter Value Source 
Minority proportion (P): 0.06 SCS 
Overall unemployment rate 0.13 SCS 
Number of workers (N) 4800 WSIES 
Number of firms (F) 165 WSIES  
Total number of jobs 4176 WSIES 
Number of jobs in each firm (θf) Same distribution as WSIES  WSIES 
Number of Coptic employers 14 WSIES 
Number of Muslim employers 151 WSIES 
discrimination-const 0.7 WSIES 
Level of referral hiring 0.65 ED 
LW, LN and LR 0.3, 0.5, 0.01 (respectively) ED 
Maximum network size  of  agents (Si) Normal (8,3) ED 
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linear. Levels of workplace and social segregation were found to be negatively 
correlated with the proportion of the minority and with firm size.  
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